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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENEVIEVE A. SMITH, JESSE E. SMITH, 
BETH M. SMITH, and SALLI SMITH GIRARD, 
vs. 
Involuntary Defendants, 
Pla1nt1ff and Respondent,) 
CHARLES L. APPLEBY, JR., CATHERINE R. 
APPLEBY, DON BJARNSON, and GRACE 
BJARNSON, 
Defendants, Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 17661 
The Plaintiffs initially filed a Verified Complaint 
seeking the forfeiture of a lease by reason of the Defendants' 
alleged failure to maintain insurance on the premises as 
required therein. Plaintiffs also sought a temporary re-
straining order affirmatively requiring the Defendants to 
maintain insurance during the pendency of the action. The 
Defendants/Appellants [hereinafter "Appellants"] responded 
claiming that they had timely cured the deficiency regarding 
insurance pursuant to the terms and periods allowed by the 
lease and that forfeiture should not be declared. Appellants 
also alleged that the Plaintiffs were aware and had consented 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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to the lack of insurance and had waived and were estopped 
from seeking a forfeiture by Plaintiffs' actions rnconsis-
tent therewith. Lastly, the Appellants counterclaimed 
alleging that the Plaintiffs had violated several covenants 
of the lease, and were in material breach thereof, Appellants 
further seeking to establish their rights to quiet enjoyment 
of the leasehold pursuant to its terms. 
Prior to trial, three of the four Plaintiffs 
initially filing suit entered into a stipulation with the 
Appellants to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice as to all 
issues pertaining to them with the exception that the in-
junctive relief pertaining to the issuance of insurance 
would continue. These same parties also stipulated that 
each party would bear his or her own attorney's fees and 
costs. The case was continued through trial by the remaining 
Plaintiff and the Respondent herein, Salli Smith Girard, also 
known as Salli Smith Girard Clinger. 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In an initial series of findings, together with an 
order dated March 6, 1981, the court declined to declare a 
forfeiture of the lease finding that the alleged breaches, 
if any, were not so substantial as to require the penalty of 
1At trial, Mrs. Girard had remarried and testimony was given 
under the name of Clinger. 
2 
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forfeiture insofar as the Plaintiff had now been placed in a 
position as if no such breach had ever occured. The court 
further found that the continuing acceptance of rents by the 
lessors constituted a waiver of their claim to the penalty 
of forfeiture. (R304) With regard to the three named 
Plaintiffs who had earlier stipulated to the dismissal of 
the suit, the court declined to honor that dismissal and, 
instead, joined them as involuntary parties Defendant. (See 
Finding of Fact #2, R302-03; Rl62, Rl64) Thereafter, without 
motion, the lower court assumed the task of Respondent's 
trial strategy and reopened the case, sua sponte, to take 
testimony on Respondent Girard's attorneys' fees, upon which 
issue no evidence had been given by Respondent at trial. 
Respondent Girard then submitted two affidavits, 
one by Mr. John L. Miles, counsel for Mrs. Girard, and one 
by Ronald B. Boutwell, counsel for the other Plaintiffs, who 
had been joined by the court as involuntary parties Defendant. 
(R322, 337) Counsel for Appellant filed an opposing Affidavit. 
(R332-33) Mr. Miles affidavit requested $350. 00 and Mr. 
Boutwell's affidavit indicated that his attorney's fees were 
$3,137.50. (R338). Thereafter, in a series of an additional 
findings of fact dated the March 18, 1981, the court disre-
garded the affidavit filed by Appellants and awarded to the 
Respondent Mrs. Girard the attorneys fees as set forth in 
the affidavits of Mr. Miles, as well as Mr. Boutwell. (Finding 
of Fact No. 16, R341) 
3 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek modification of the judgment belo11 
on the grounds that the attorneys' fees awarded to the 
Respondent Clinger are not supported by any testimony properly 
before the court. Appellants seek reversal on the grounds 
that there was no just cause to reopen the case without 
motion and the court's judicial paternalism to the Respondent 
Girard vicariously undertook her trial strategy, which was 
best left to either of her two counsel at trial. Appellants 
further seek reversal of the attorney's fees on the further 
ground that an award of an attorneys' fee, when the Appellants 
had previously stipulated to the continuing issuance of the 
injunction, which was the sole relief awarded at trial, is 
inappropria~e. Furthermore, Appellants seek reversal of the 
attorney's fees awarded to Respondent Girard on the grounds 
that that award to her for costs set forth by the Affidavit 
of Mr. Boutwell, counsel for the involuntary parties defendant, 
is without natural logic as there is no evidence before the 
court as to any obligation of the Respondent Girard to pay 
counsel for these involuntary parties who were again joined 
without motion. 
Lastly, Appellants seek reversal of that portion 
of the court's judgment denying them their attorneys fees 
as testified to at trial, such attorney's fees being expended 
to sustain the leasehold and prevent the forfeiture of the 
lease when a timely cure had been made. 
4 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arose out of a lease initially executed 
on the 23rd day of July, 1975, for a parcel of property near 
Hurricane, Utah, commonly known as 11 Pah Tempe 11 or "The Hot 
Springs 11 • The property under lease is part of a canyon 
within which there is a natural phenomenon of heated mineral 
waters. The initial Lessors were E. Penn Smith and Genevieve 
A. Smith with the initial Lessees being Charles L. Appleby, 
Jr., David E. Wood and Don Bjarnson and their wives. Mr. 
and Mrs. Wood later sold out to the Appleby's and Bjarnson's 
and Mr. Smith later passed away so at the time of trial, the 
Lessors interest were held in three equal shares as tenants 
in common by Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith and Salli 
Smith Girard, also known at the time of trial as Salli Smith 
Girard Clinger. (Partial Transcript, hereinafter PT30:1-5,15) 
Initially drafted by the Lessors, the lease en-
couraged the Lessee to improve the property thereon and pro-
vided for a rental which combined both a flat rate and, 
under certain circumstances, a percentage of the gross 
receipts. The parties also agreed that the premises and 
facilities should be operated as a 11 recreational and thera-
putic spa 11 • (See P-3 at p. 3) As relevant to Respondent's 
cause of action filed below, paragraph 9 of the lease re-
quired the Lessees to maintain liability insurance in the 
sum of $300,000 on the premises and paragraph 12 of the 
5 
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lease required either party to be responsible to the ~cn-de­
faul ting party for reasonable attorney's fees incurred "in 
enforcing the terms of this agreement or exercising an2r 
rights or remedies hereunder or any rights or remedies other-
wise provided by law". Paragraph 13 of the lease also pro-
vided that the Lessees had "thirty (30) days in which to 
cure" any default in the terms of the lease. (See P-3) 
While the Respondent Girard has chosen to cross-
appeal without the benefit of a transcript, nonetheless, the 
following facts can be gathered from the court's findings and 
her testimony, which was prepared as part of a partial 
transcript requested by the Appellants. ( R3 58, see also, 
Clerks Certificate filed June 1, 1981) Appellants first came 
on the leased premises and, as Respondent recalls, built a 
living room, fireplace and bunk room. (T78:25-28) Respondent 
also recalls the Lessees constructing two new bedrooms to-
gether with closets as an annex to the initial office space 
on the premises. (T79:26-29) Other improvements constructed 
by the Lessees consisted, in the Respondent's own words, of 
an entirely new and modern cabin on the premises, picnic 
tables, a wishing well and sprinklers substantially doubling 
the earlier living space. (T79:26-29; T83:5-9, 26-30; T87:1-SI 
Additionally, Respondent Girard testified that the Lessees 
had put cinders in the parking lot, placed a lighted sign on 
the highway to the premises, repaired a gaping hole in the 
6 
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grottos in the theraputic hot water areas, and repaired 
crumbling plaster, replacing the same with a hand painted 
mural around the pool area. 
T86) 
(T81:28-82:1; T81:8-ll; T84; 
In early 1978, the cost of insuring the premises 
with the previous insurer suddenly trebled and the Lessees 
failed to renew their policy advising the Lessors of their 
concern and requesting the Lessors' help to obtain an al-
ternative source of insurance. (T71:13-15; T40:3; T39:12-13; 
T72 at 30) Finally, on or about March 20, 1978, both Lessors 
and Lessees were very actively concerned about getting insur-
ance. (T39:5-7J As a result, sometime in late March of 1978, 
the Lessors sent Lessees an undated "Notice to Cure Defaults". 
(P-4) Shortly thereafter, on May 8, 1978, the Lessors' attor-
ney, Ronald Boutwell, filed a Verified Complaint on behalf of 
Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, Beth M. Smith, his wife, 
and Salli smith Girard. 
In their first cause of action, Lessors alleged 
that the Appellants were in default on their lease because 
insurance, as required thereby, had not otherwise been ob-
tained. As a result of this allegation, the Respondent 
claimed a forfeiture of the leasehold and an entitlement to 
re-enter and take possession of the premises. The second 
cause of action, plead in equity, sought an immediate in-
junction of any activities on the leased premises unless 
$300,000 of liability insurance was first obtained by Appel-
lants. (Rl-7) While an unsigned copy of the "Notice to 
7 
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Cure Defaults" attached to the Complaint as Exhibit B re-
ferred to matters other than insurance, such matters were 
not alluded to whatsoever within the pleadings in the com-
plaint. (Rl-8, 19-21) And while the Appellants sought to 
correct all of those matters mentioned in the "Notice to 
Cure Defaults", they discovered that outside of those in-
surance matters plead in the complaint, the Lessors also had 
no information whatsoever upon which the other matters set 
forth in the "Notice to Cure Defaults 11 were framed. In the 
Respondent Girard' s own words at trial, she admitted not 
knowing what violations other than those of insurance, in 
fact, existed until January of 1981. (T68-69) Mrs. Girard 
later explained the Lessors 1 lack of knowledge as follows: 
Well, Mr. Boutwell filed this and he told us 
that there were no doubts codes were being 
broken, but we were not told what specific 
codes. (T69:25-27) 
On August 17th of 1978, Defendants filed their 
answer and counterclaim pertaining to the insurance issues 
raised in the complaint, pleading estopple and waiver among 
their affirmative defenses and further denying those alle-
gations pertaining to their alleged bad faith refusal to get 
insurance. Defendants further alleged that they had properly 
cured the default within the time allowed pursuant to the 
lease and counterclaimed alleging some material breaches of 
the lease by Lessors. ( R44) Respondent 1 s reply to the 
counterclaim was not filed until 15 months later and the 
8 
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counterclaim itself was not actively pursued at trial. (R72, 
Findings of Fact 11 and 12, R305) 
While the Lessors, pending trial, continually 
alluded to alleged health code violations, they never clari-
fied what these were until the day of trial. And, while 
Lessors' counsel had ample opportunity over a period of over 
three years to amend their complaint, no motion was ever 
made prior to trial, and thus, matters outside of those 
allegations pertaining to insurance were not properly before 
the court. 
With regard to insurance, the partial transcript 
ordered by the Appellants contains the testimony of Mr. 
Douglas Labrum2 who was retained by Appellants to obtain 
insurance on the premises. Mr. Labrum's testimony reveals 
the following: First, that after delivery of the Notice to 
Cure Defaults, Mr. Donald Bjarnson, one of the Lessees, 
approached Mr. Labrum very anxious to obtain insurance in 
March of 1978. (T20:19) Labrum described Bjarnson's atti-
tude as "eager", indicating that Bjarnson literally barraged 
the insurance agency with phone calls in order to obtain 
rnsurance. (PT16; 19; 20-23) Labrum thereafter indicated 
that the first coverage on the Hot Springs was obtained by 
reason of a binder issued March 19, 1978 (PT14:26-28) and 
2Labrum was called by Respondent Girard as her witness. 
9 
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that this binder was good for thirty days. (PT35:H-18) 
Labrum also testified that it is often conceivable that 
binders do not result in the ultimate issuance of a policy 
and that the insurance company often sends engineers to 
check the risk and to give the property owners a list of 
things which need to be corrected prior to the policy being 
issued (PT15:6-8; 19:20-29; 28:13-24) While Mr. Bjarnson's 
instructions were to do everything possible to maintain 
insurance on the premises, it was clear that at times binders 
were rejected and checks made out to Mr. Labrum from the 
Lessees were returned. (PT21:1-5, 12-15) The nature of the 
resort made it difficult for the agent to place the coverage. 
(PT20:28-30) 
Regardless of the difficulty in placing insurance, 
Labrum later testified that between March and the date of 
trial, there were only two periods rn which no coverage 
existed; one being a twelve day period beginning April 27, 
1978 and the other being a thirty day period between June 20 
and July 20 subsequent to the filing of the cause of action 
in May of 1978. (PT15:20-25; 17:25-30; 18:4-8) Upon cross 
examination, however, Labrum recanted his earlier testimony 
and indicated that coverage was extended through June 20 and 
that the only lapse of coverage after March 19, 1978 occurred 
between June 20 and July 20, 1978, that period being clearly 
subsequent to the filing of the complaint. (See Rl; PT18:14-30; 
19:1-3, 19-30; PT22:13-20; PT22:26-23:1) The basis for Labrum 
10 
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recanting his earlier testimony was a memo in his own file 
from the insurance company's agent and underwriter, which 
extended coverage on the basis of an engineer's view of the 
premises through June 20. (Id; PT22:26-23:1; PT20:1-9) 
After July 20, there was continuous coverage up through the 
date of trial. (PT17:30-18:3) Ultimately, the policy was 
actually issued on September 28, 1978 with Mr. Bj ams on 
instructing Mr. Labrum to make his files open and available 
at all times to any of the Lessors. (PT23: 29-30; 27: 26-30) 
In early 1980, Mr. Boutwell withdrew his counsel 
for Salli Smith Girard Clinger. Ultimately, John L. Miles 
filed a formal notice of appearance on her behalf on 
September 2, 1980. (Rll7) 
In November of 1980, Boutwell met with all of the 
Plaintiffs, including Mrs. Girard, and his clients made it 
clear that they were satisfied that the Lessees had complied 
with their demands for insurance and wanted the suit dis-
missed. (PT48:ll-20) Thereafter, Boutwell called the Appel-
lants' attorney advising him that he believed all of the 
Plaintiffs were going to dismiss the suit. On December 8, 
1980, the Plaintiffs Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith and 
Beth M. Smith, through their attorney Ronald Boutwell, and 
the Defendants, Appellants herein, by and through their 
attorney, Michael D. Hughes, stipulated as follows: 
1. That the complaint as to the stipulating 
parties be dismissed with prejudice as to 
those issues raised on behalf of the three 
stipulating Plaintiffs. 
11 
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2. That the injunction requiring Defendants 
[Appellants] to maintain insurance CO'lerage 
remain in full force and effect, not berng 
dismissed with the dismissal of the complaint. 
3. That each party bear hi.s or her own 
costs and expenses incurred in the action. 
(Rl61) 
This stipulation arose as a direct result of the earlier 
meeting at which the remaining Plaintiff [Respondent) Salli 
Smith Girard was present, and, though the stipulation was 
referred to on two different occasions on the law and motion 
calendar, a copy of the same was inadvertantly not mailed to 
Mr. Miles, counsel for the remaining Plaintiff, Salli Smith 
Girard. A partial dismissal with prejudice reflecting the 
stipulation appears in the record at 164 and indicates that 
the complaint be dismissed with prejudice as for Plaintiffs 
Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith and Beth M. Smith, but 
that the preliminary injunction remain in full force and 
effect and that no costs and attorney's fees be assessed 
against any of the parties to the stipulation. (Rl64) 
During the pendency of these proceedings, all of 
the Plaintiffs, including Mrs. Girard, continued to accept 
rents from the Appellants herein for the leasehold premises. 
(PT63:23-24; Finding of Fact No. 7, R304-05) At the time of 
trial, the three named Plaintiffs, Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse 
E. Smith and Beth M. Smith, did not appear as parties, but 
merely as witnesses. They all represented to the court that 
they did not desire to be parties to the law suit. The 
court upon hearing that evidence, found that such was the 
12 
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case. (Finding of Fact No. 2, 302-03) While Mr. Boutwell 
testified as a witness at trial, he also did not participate 
as counsel. Thus, in the partial transcript there is no 
reflection of any direct or cross examination conducted ty 
Mr. Boutwell, despite the Appellants' request that the 
partial transcript contain 11 [a]ll direct and cross examination 
conducted by Ronald B. Boutwell." (See clerk's certificate 
filed June 1, 1981, together with attachments.) 
During the trial, the Respondent, Mrs. Girard, who 
was represented by both Mr. Miles and Mr. Wright, moved to 
amend the complaint and proceed on another theory involving 
health code violations based upon information tendered to 
the Appellants on the morning of the trial and filed that 
same date with the court. (Rl72-l83) This information was 
tendered only after the Appellant had strenuously urged a 
clarification of Mrs. Girard' s position through several 
earlier discovery motions. (See PTl-8) Mrs. Girard explained 
the difficulty as to obtaining thi~ information, stating 
that she did not know the exact nature of the cause of 
action she chose to plead even until the month of trial. 
(T68:28-69:10; PT69:25-27) As a result of Plaintiff Girard's 
failure to clarify her position and to formally amend her 
cause of action, and, further, as a result of the late 
tender of any discovery thereon, the Appellants objected 
strenuously throughout trial to the amendment of any pleadings 
to raise causes of actions not properly framed and before 
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the court. While the court allowed such testimony to enter 
into the record, it noted the Appellants' counsel's continuing 
objection to all testimony pertaining to matters outside of 
the relevant insurance questions. (PT32:28; 33:7-14) Plain-
tiff Girard, on the other hand, asserted that her cause of 
action as recently discovered by her was fairly plead by 
reference to the Notice to Cure Default attached as an exhibit 
to the original complaint. Ultimately, the court in accor-
dance with Chesney v. Chesney, 33 Utah 503, 94 Pac. 989 
(1908), sustained Appellants' objection and excluded from its 
ruling all matters pertaining to causes not formally raised 
by the pleadings and not tried by consent. 
During the trial, Respondent Girard also sought to 
introduce testimony pertaining to matters which had occurred 
on the leased premises only two or three months prior to trial. 
At best, the major thrust of her lawsuit pertained to the 
lapse in insurance from June 20 through July 20, 1978 despite 
the fact that the verified complaint again was filed on May 
8, 1978, some six weeks before the alleged material breach 
occured. Appellants again objected to the court taking 
evidence on facts occuring ~fter the filing of a complaint 
since Respondent's cause of action must exist either at the 
time of filing of the complaint or not at all. This position, 
framed in reference to the Costagno v. Nyman case, No. 16905 
(Utah, filed in September 24, 1980) was rejected by the court, 
though the Appellants firmly believed that they had cured the 
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default in securing insurance as was reflected by the testi-
mony of Doug Labrum at trial. 
At the end of Respondent Girard's case, both of 
her attorney's rested having presented no evidence on at-
torney's fees. (Finding of Fact number 8, R305) The Appel-
lants finished their rebuttal of the Plaintiff's case and 
their counsel was then sworn to testify as to his attorney's 
fees in defending the lease from forfeiture. His testimony 
established that a reasonable fee in the instant case on 
Appellants behalf would be $2,000. (PT92:18-93:2) 
On cross-examination of Appellants' counsel, 
Respondent Girard' s counsel attempted to establish her 
attorney's fees in the following manner: 
Q: You consider that, then, ($2,000] a 
reasonable amount, is that right, Mr. Hughes? 
A: For my services, yes. 
Q: And that would be a reasonable sum, 
then, for attorneys on the opposing side? 
A: I couldn't testify to your case in 
direct, Mr. Wright. 
Q: My question is, that figure would be a 
reasonable figure, don't you think? 
A: I have no way of knowing what your 
billing system is at your office. 
Q: That would .be a reasonable fee for an 
attorney, would it not? 
A: For my services, yes. 
(R93:5-19) 
It was clear from the above cross examination that 
both of Respondent Girard's counsel realized they had failed 
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to present any testimony on Respondent's attorneys' fees at 
trial and were trying to inferentially put sufficient testi-
mony into evidence by the cross-examination of Appellants' 
counsel. Nonetheless, Respondent's counsel did not move to 
reopen the case and present evidence on their attorney's 
fees, apparently declining to do so as part of their trial 
strategy. Whatever the reason, this is a decision uniquely 
left to counsel as part of the adversary process. 
After the trial, the district court set aside its 
own order of dismissal based upon the prior stipulation and 
rejoined Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith and Beth M. 
Smith to the action as involuntary parties defendant. (Rl62, 
164, Finding of Fact number 2, R302-3) Thereafter, the 
court dissallowed those amendments to the cause of action 
proposed by Respondent Girard during trial, holding that the 
evidence presented thereon throughout trial had been subject 
to the continuing objection of Appellants' counsel and that 
there was no reason produced for the Respondents not having 
formally moved to amend prior to trial. (Finding of Fact No. 
4, R303-04) In failing to allow the amendment, the court 
noted that its action was well within its discretion under 
Rule 15 U.R.C.P. (Id.) All testimony received pertainir-g to 
those causes of action, and all objections relating to the 
tes~imony and exhibits pertaining to those causes of action 
were thereafter sustained. (1..9..) 
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Despite Appell ants cure within the time alloted 
within the lease pursuant to the testimony of Doug Labrum, 
the court found, nonetheless, that there had been a breach 
of the lease, but that the same was not sufficient to justify 
a forfeiture of the leasehold. (Findings of Fact 6 and 7, 
R304-305) These findings were based on the court's judgment 
that a penalty of the nature sought after by Respondent 
Girard was disproportionate to her claimed losses and that 
the Lessors as a whole had been placed in a equivalent 
position as if the breach "relatively short in duration" had 
not occurred. (Id.) The court further found that all of the 
Lessors had accepted rent consistent with their desire to 
continue their status under the terms of the leasehold. 
(Id.) 
Appellant's attorney's fees previously testified 
to at trial in sustaining the lease and avoiding forfeiture 
were anomalously denied. Nonetheless, without further 
motion, the court, in an act of judicial paternalism, re-
opened the case to receive evidence as to the Respondent's 
attorney's fees, finding that her omission of any evidence 
thereon may have been caused, in part, by R~spondent's own 
pursuit of causes of action not properly before the court. 
This reopening of the case weeks after trial was directly 
contrary to the Appellants' interest and directly favorable 
to the interests of Respondent. Again, the case was reopened 
without motion and, despite the court's finding that the 
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omission was somewhat inadvertant, or perhaps caused by 
Respondent's own attorneys' efforts to amend during trial. it 
is clear that the court was in error in actively assuming the 
position of Respondent Girard's trial strategist. Her attor-
ney's cross-examination of Appellants counsel, ante pp. 
15-16, clearly revealed that they were well aware of this 
ommission. 
While the court invited Respondent's counsel to 
optionally present further testimony on attorney's fees, 
Respondent's attorneys chose to bear their burden of proof by 
submitting two affidavits, one by Mr. Miles testifying to 
$350.00 attorney's fees and the other by Mr. Boutwell, who, 
similar to his clients had not appeared at trial other than 
as a witness. (R322, 337) Again, it cannot be gainsaid that 
Boutwell conducted no direct or cross examination at trial. 
(See clerk's certificate filed June 1, 1981, together with 
attachments, and PT) Mr. Boutwell's affidavit stated that he 
had incurred attorney's fees of $3,137.50. (R338) Appellants' 
counsel filed an opposing affidavit indicating that in light 
of the Appellants' cooperation in obtaining insurance, a 
reasonable attorney's fee on Respondent's behalf could be no 
more than $250.00. (R332-33) 
In a series of additional findings filed on March 
18, 1981, the court awarded the remaining Plaintiff, Salli 
Smith Girard, the sum of 53,487.50 in attorneys fees simply 
adding those figures submitted by John L. Miles and Ronald E. 
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Boutwell. (R340-41, No. 16) This finding came despite the 
fact that Mr. Boutwell did not represent Mrs. Girard and had 
earlier stipulated on behalf of all of his clients that each 
party represented by him would bear their own costs and 
expenses incurred in the action. ( Rl62) Again this stipu-
lation was reflected by an order executed by the court. 
(Rl6..J:) 
The court further found that the attorney's fees 
were awardable to the Respondent Girard because trial of the 
matter had resulted in the finding that a "breach of the 
insurance covenant had occured, and that a permanent in-
junction could issue, without bond." (R341) Again, however, 
Appellants had already stipulated that the injunction continue, 
and the bond required by an earlier order of the court on 
September 12, 1978, was only $500.00, or approximately one-
seventh of the attorney's fees awarded. (Rl62, 164; R67-68) 
Ultimately, the award of attorney's fees was a conclusion 
perhaps foreshadowed by the court's own assumption of Respon-
dent's trial strategy. Having personally reopened the case 
on Respondent Girard's behalf, it perhaps begs the question 
to ask why the opposing affidavit of Appellant's counsel 
pertaining to an appropriate attorney's fees on Respondent's 
behalf was given no evidentiary weight and the two affidavits 
of Mr. Miles and Mr. Boutwell, which were not subject to 
cross examination, were accorded full evidentiary value. 
As a result of the foregoing rulings, this apppeal 
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was taken on behalf of Appellants to reverse the award of 
attorney's fees on Respondent Girard' s behalf and again 
reverse that denial of attorney's fees requested by Appel-
lants and testified to at trial by their counsel. This 
appeal contends that the system of justice in Utah is basi-
cally adversarial and that counsel must ultimately take the 
responsibility for trial strategy, it being inappropriate for 
the court to reach out and assume the task of deciding an 
issue contrary to one party's interest when no evidence has 
been presented during trial upon that issue. 
APPELLANTS' POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO TESTIMONY PROPERLY REGARDED AS . 
SUCH UPON WHICH THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT a5P0°vJ 
GIRARD MAY BE AWARDED ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
At the close of trial, Respondent Girard rested her 
case without giving any testimony on attorney's fees and 
without requesting to reopen her case to present testimony to 
pursue that matter. (Findings of Fact No. 8, R305) Despite 
the fact that the Respondent Girard bore the burden of proof 
at all stages of the trial to present testimony on this 
matter and failed to do so, the lower court, sua sponte, 
reopened the case after a series of findings dispositive of 
the material issues in the suit. (R302-06) This case was 
reopened solely to provide Mrs. Girard the opportunity to 
bear the burden of proof on the issue of her attorney's 
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fees, upon which no evidence had been presented at trial. 
Her attorneys chose to bear this burden by the presentation 
of affidavits which were contraverted by an opposing affi-
davit in the lecord. (R322-24, 337-39, & 332-34) Thereafter, 
the court simply chose to disregard the contradictory affi-
davit of Appellant's counsel and awarded attorney's fees 
based upon the affidavits of John L. Miles, counsel for Mrs. 
Girard, and Ronald B. Boutwell, who filed an affidavit 
regarding his attorney's fees but did not articulate whether 
Mrs. Girard was indebted to him or whether, in fact, he had 
been paid, either by her, or his other clients who had 
continuously requested dismissal from the suit. 
As there was no stipulation on an appropriate 
attorney's fee, the award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Girard 
in the instant case should be reversed since, simply stated, 
it was not 11 based on sworn testimony" properly subject to 
cross examination at trial. See Aiken v. Burrows, 30 Utah 
2d ll6, 514 P.2d 533 (1973). 
In the early case of Crooks v. Harmon, 29 Utah 
304, 81 Pac. 95 (1905), Cheif Justice Bartch speaking for 
the Supreme Court said: 
The word 'testimony' is a restricted, limited 
term, consisting only of the statements of 
witnesses, while the word. 'evidence' is a. 
comprehensive term, embracing not only testi-
mony, or the stat~ments. of witnesses, but. 
also documents, written instruments, admissions 
of parties, and whatever may be submitted to 
a court or jury to elucidate an issue or 
prove a case. 81 Pac. at 96 
21 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Similarly, three years later, Che if Justice McCarthy in 
Carter v. Cummings-Neilson Co., 34 Utah 315, 97 Pac. 335 
( 1908), stated the following in defining the word "testirnc~ .. 
The word 'testimony', when used as it is in 
the foregoing certificate, is not synonomous 
with evidence. The former refers to and 
includes one species of evidence, namely, the 
oral statements made by witnesses while 
testifying; whereas, the latter is a generic 
term, and includes any species of evidence or 
proof submitted to a court or jury rn the 
trial of a case. 97 Pac at 335. 
That the word testimony continues to be a restrictive term 
is clear in the recent Idaho case of Comish v. Smith, 97 
Idaho 89, 540 P.2d 274 (1975), wherein the Idaho Supreme 
Court confirms that "testimony" is "merely a species of 
evidence which is produced by oral statements of the witness.' 
540 P.2d at 278 
In the instant case, there was no testimony pre-
sented on attorney's fees during trial. Respondent Girard's 
counsel failed to open the case before closing argument or 
even before the initial findings of fact were entered to put 
on testimony subject to cross examination, thus waiving her 
claim to the same. The court's award, therefore, is based 
on contested affidavits filed subsequent to trial, such 
affidavits being invited by the court's own solicitous 
ruling. As the burden of proof to sustain an appropriate 
award of attorney's fees is Respondent's, this Court should 
reverse and reject the judgment for attorney's fees as there 
is no stipulation or "testimony" as such upon which the 
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appropriate award may be based. It is clear from the partial 
transcript of trial that the Respondent Girard' s counsel 
knew they had failed to present evidence thereon, strenuously 
attempting to establish their attorney's fees through the 
testimony of opposing counsel. (PT at 93:6-21) Failing to 
do that, they also neglected to appropriately reopen the 
case. The lower court's subsequent indulgence of the Respon-
dent in reopening the case for her, harmed the Appellants, 
and is much too close to overt advocacy favorable to one 
party. Further, the contested affidavits presented therein 
are simply not sufficient upon which to base an award of 
attorney's fees, not being otherwise subject to cross exam-
ination. 
POINT I I 
THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED BY THE JUDGE ARE 
CONTRARY TO THE STIPULATION ENTERED INTO 
BETWEEN APPELLANTS' COUNSEL AND COUNSEL FOR 
THE INVOLUNTARY DEFENDANTS, RONALD BOUTWELL, 
UPON WHOSE AFFIDAVIT THE LARGEST PORTION OF 
THE ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS BASED. 
Initially this suit was pursued by four Plaintiffs, 
three of which have a present interest in the Hot Springs. 
(Rl, PT at 30:1-15) Attorney Ronald B. Boutwell represented 
all of the Plaintiffs in the action at its inception. 
On September 12, 1978, a preliminary injunction as 
to the operation of the resort was issued. (R 67, 68) The 
insurance problem, which had been raised in both the notice 
to cure and the complaint was already in the process of being 
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resolved among the parties at that time, first, with the 
issuance of binders and ultimately by the issuance of a 
policy on September 28, 1978. (PT at 23:29-30) 
By November of 1980, Mr. Jesse Smith, his wife Beth 
Smith and Mrs. Genevieve Smith informed their attorney, Mr. 
Boutwell, that they intended to pursue the case no further. 
(PT48:11-20) Thereafter, Mr. Boutwell, acting at his clients' 
request, secured a stipulation from Appellants' attorney in 
which all of the parties to that stipulation agreed as follows: 
(1) that the Complaint on file be dismissed with prejudice as 
it relates to issues raised on behalf of the three Plaintiffs 
previously named; (2) that the injuction requiring Defendants 
[Appellants herein] to maintain insurance coverage on the 
leased premises remain in full force and effect; and (3) that 
each party bear his or her own costs and expenses incurred in 
this action. Executed on December 8, 1980, this stipulation 
appears in the record at page 162. Prior to executing the 
same, Boutwell had already informed Mrs. Girard that it would 
be in her best interest to find a new attorney since it would 
be difficult for him to continue to represent her as a result 
of the anticipated settlement by the other plaintiffs. At 
trial, the stipulating Plaintiffs stated to the court that 
they did not want to be parties to the law suit, but the 
court joined them as involuntary defendants, again without 
motion. (Finding of Fact No.2, R302-03) 
At trial, Mr. Miles and Mr. Wright represented the 
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Respondent herein; Mr. Boutwell, not only did not represent 
Mrs. Girard, but did not even appear in the case as counsel. 
In its initial series of findings and order when the court 
reopened the case, it invited Mr. Wright and Mr. Miles to 
present evidence pertaining to their attorney's fees. Their 
firm then prepared an affidavit for Mr. Boutwell's signature 
which states that he was at one time the attorney for all 
the Plaintiffs and that the sum of $3, 137. 50 would be a 
reasonable attorney's fees for him in the above entitled 
matter. (R 337-39) While Plaintiff Girard' s counsel had 
successfully moved to set aside the stipulation executed by 
the other co-plaintiffs, neither they nor their attorney, Mr. 
Boutwell, joined in that motion. (Finding of Fact No. 2, 
R302-03; R210) Furthermore, the affidavit of Boutwell at no 
point indicates that Mrs. Girard is indebted to him for that 
amount or that that sum has been paid by her. In fact, logic 
and equity would indicate that his attorney's fees at best, 
would have to be divided equally between his clients. None-
theless, the court in awarding attorney's fees awarded the 
remaining Plaintiff, Mrs. Girard, all of those attorney's 
fees set forth in Ronald B. Boutwell's affidavit despite the 
fact that three of his four clients stipulated that they 
would be responsible for their own costs and expenses. (See 
Finding of Fact No. 16, R341; Rl62, 164) 
While Respondent Girard's attorneys moved to set 
aside the order of the court based upon the stipulation at 
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Rl64, their motion was framed on the premise that the stipu-
lating Plaintiffs needed to be rejoined in the lawsmt. 
While the court did rejoin those parties, it is evident that 
they did not desire to be part of the trial by the Findings 
of Fact entered thereon. (Finding of Fact No. 2, R302-03J 
Nonetheless, the court's refusal to honor that portion of the 
stipulation relating to those parties bearing their own costs 
and expenses is reversable error. Simply stated, once a 
stipulation is signed, it becomes part of the record of the 
case, having the same effect and potency as an order of the 
Court agreed to by the parties thereto. 83 C.J.S. Stipulations 
§6 (1953) 
While apparently the court did not choose to be 
bound by the stipulation in the instant case, the court 
should, nonetheless, have disregard that portion of Boutwell's 
affidavit relating to attorney's fees charged to all four 
clients which at one time were represented by him. As stated 
in Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 524 P.2d 271 (Alaska 
1974): 
An attorney retain.ed in .negotiating the t.erms 
of an agreement binds his client to promises 
made within the scope of that authority. Id. 
at 275. 
Again, there is no indiciation in Mr. Boutwell's affidavit 
what portion of those fees sought in this affidavit are 
properly assessable on behalf of the remaining Plaint~ff, 
Mrs. Girard. (R337-39) 
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In the stipulation bearing Mr. Boutwell's signa-
tures, is the statement "each party hereto shall bear his or 
her own costs and expenses incurred in this action." (Rl62) 
This statement implies that each party to the stipulation 
will equally absorb the expense of the action. The logical 
assumption in the instant case is that Boutwell's clients 
would equally di vi de the initial costs of securing their 
rights. Nonetheless, the court's ruling has awarded to the 
remaining Plaintiff, Mrs. Girard, all of those attorney's 
fees incurred by Mr. Boutwell in representing all four 
plaintiffs. As the result, Boutwell' s affidavit, which 
neither divides the attorney's fees between his clients or 
indicates that Mrs. Girard is obligated to him for that 
amount or, in fact, any amount or whether she is indebted to 
him at all should be disregarded. (R 337-39) Boutwell' s 
earlier acquiescence to the stipulation that each party 
should bear his or her own costs would seemingly disqualify 
the larger portion of his fees testified to as being assess-
able at this time against the Appellants. (Rl62) The 
court's holding the Appellants responsible for all of Bout-
well' s fees, including those generated for clients who did 
not participate in the trial as parties and who chose to 
settle the case with Appellants is patently in error. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
SUA SPONTE REOPENING THE CASE ON THE ISSUE OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED UPON A FINDING OF FACT, 
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WHICH FINDING WAS NEITHER RAISED, PLEAD OR 
ARGUED BY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL AND WHICH 
FINDING IS NOT SUFFICIENT UNDER RULE 61 OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE TO OTHERWISE 
OPEN CASES TO PRESENT NEW EVIDENCE. 
The lower court has no justification in the case 
at bar for sua sponte reopening the case for the presen-
tation of evidence on the issue of attorney's fees. While 
the reopening of cases to preserve the furtherance of justice 
is allowable, in this instance the court has abused its 
discretion for lack of good reason. 
Ordinarily a case is only reopened, subject to t~ 
court's discretion, on a motion by counsel. While the Court 
may indulge a variety of considerations on a motion to 
reopen, it should grant or deny the motion in light of all 
the circumstances pertaining to fairness and substantial 
justice. 6 J. Moore's Federal Practice, ~59.04[13] (2nd Ed. 
1976) quoted in Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 1976) 
Rule 61 U.R.C.P. indicates those standards to be considered 
in reviewing whether the exclusion of evidence is sufficient 
error to consider disburbing a judgment. Thus, only where 
the refusal of the Court to take action would appear to be 
inconsistent with "substantial justice" will judgment be 
disturbed. (.!i.) Otherwise, the Rule instructs: "The Court 
at every stage of the proceeding must disregard error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties." Rule 61, U. R. C. P. 
In the present case the resultant denial of Re-
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spondent' s counsel's attorney's fees bottomed on their 
failure to put on testimony of the nature and value of such 
services can hardly be considered a denial of substantial 
justice to the Respondent or her attorneys. Simply stated, 
a judgment denying Respondent her attorneys' fees is the 
natural and logical consequence of her counsels' failure to 
testify thereon. Further, their absent testimony is totally 
irrelevant to the material relief afforded by the judgment. 
Nonetheless, the lower court below disregarded the appropriate 
parameters of Rule 61, and assumed a position much akin to 
Respondent's advocate in personally reopening the case to 
thereafter assess against the Appellants over $3, 000 in 
attorney's fees. And, as the court reopened the case, sua 
sponte, the Appellants did not even have an opportunity to 
resist the ruling. 
As previously alluded to, while the consideration 
as to whether or not to reopen is discretionary, thereby 
granting considerable latitude of judgment to the court, 
this does not mean unrestrained power to act 
in a capricious or arbitrary manner which may 
produce an inequitable or unjust result. The 
word "discretion" its elf imports the action 
should be taken with reason and in good con-
science, and with an understanding of a.nd 
consideration for the rights of the parties, 
for the purpose of serving the always desired 
objective of doing justice between them. 
Davis v. Rile~, 20 Utah 2d 325, 437 P.2d 453, 
455 (1968).ee also Gardner v. Christensen, 
622 P.2d 782 (Utah 198 . 
Such discretion does not justify in this instance the as-
sumption by the lower court of the role of advocate when 
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error has been made by counsel 111 the establishing of e·il-
dence on attorney's fees. 
In a recent Utah case, Judge Stewart, in his con-
curring opinion, rndicated that courts should not reach "out 
and . [assume] the task of deciding an issue contrary to 
one party's interest when the issue has not been litigated.' 
Continuing, he stated: 
I have no doubt that the administration of 
justice is likely to be greatly enhanced when 
trial judges act not solely as passive arbi-
ters but, when occasion demands, become in-
volved to assure the just outcome of a cause. 
But in the end, our system of justice is 
basically adversarial, and counsel must 
ultimately take the responsibili tv for the 
trial strategv. Dixion v. Stoddara, 627 P.2d 
83, 84 (Utah 1981 . 
Here the court gratuitously provided a mechanism 
whereby counsel, at his convenience, could rectify his 
error. It is a general rule in most jurisdictions to permit 
a plaintiff or any party to a suit, after resting his case, 
to add to his proof, is a practice not to be encouraged. 
Jones, Evidence, §809 (3rd ed.) See also Parmenter v. 
Ranson, 169 P.2d 883 (Oregon 1946); Hall v. Hickey, 319 P.2d 
33 (Cal. 1957); O'Mally v. United Producers & Consumers 
Coop., Inc., 95 Ariz. 134, 387 P.2d 1016 (1964). The Justi-
fication for this proposition is posited on the seasoned 
reasoning that each party after having a full and complete 
opportunity to develop his case, once resting, has voluntar-
ily foregone his right to introduce fresh evidence. United 
Producers & Consumers Ccop. v. O'Mall'!, 103 Ariz. 26, -i3S 
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P.2d 575 (1968); Maass v. Peterson, 204 P.2d 1040 (Mont. 
1949). 
While this reasoning may be considered unacceptable 
in response to a timely motion from counsel, herein no such 
motion to reopen was made. Cf. Gardner v. Christensen, 622 
P.2d 782 at 784 (Utah 1980). 
The lower court in reopening solicitously specu-
lated that there may have been some confusion by Respondent's 
counsel as to what issues actually were before the court. 
This speculation is not well taken. Such confusion, if any, 
was self-inflicted by these same counsel in their desire to 
pursue issues not properly framed before the court. Never-
theless, the burden of proof remained with counsel to estab-
lish attorney's fees. 
As stated in Davis v. Riley, 20 Utah 2d 325, 437 
P.2d 453 (1968), any discretion exercised in a capricious 
and arbitrary manner, producing an inequitable or unjust re-
sult, would be an appropriate candidate for review. There 
can be no question that the result as to the issue of attor-
ney's fees in this case was unjust. There was no evidentiary 
basis upon which the court could award attorney's fees prior 
to the submission of affidavits which were not allowed as a 
result of any motion by opposing counsel, but as a result of 
an unsolicited finding of the court as to the opposing 
counsel's confusion. Such unilateral advocacy as herein 
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exercised by the trial court exemplifies Black 1 s 3 def1 
of "arbitrary" as being "'.·il thout fair, solid and substantiai 
cause; that is w1 thout cause based upon the law.'' ~ 
Lotempio, 58 F.2d 358, 359. (D.N.Y.; W.D. 1931) 
The trial court committed reversable error in re-
opening the case on the basis of a finding the Plaintiff's 
counsel was confused, which argument was ne~er raised, plead 
or argued by Plaintiff, nor is considered a valid rat1onal2 
for the amending of a judgment under Rule 61, U.R.C.P. 
POINT IV 
THE RELIEF AFFORDED THE REMAINING PLAINTIFF 
AT TRIAL IS NO GREATER THAN THJl.T TO WHICH THE 
DEFENDANT STIPULATED WELL IN ADV.A.NCE OF 
TRIAL. 
On December 8, 1980, three Plaintiffs stipulated 
to a dismissal with prejudice of the case at bar. ( Rl62, 
164) That stipulation granted these Plaintiffs an extension 
of the original preliminary injunction, which had been 
issued on September 12, 1978. (Ii.:_) The stipulation statej 
"[t)hat the Injunction requiring Defendant to maintain 
insurance coverage on the leased premises, which are the 
subject of this action, shall remain in full force and 
effect and shall not be dismissed with the dismissal of the 
Complaint." (Rl62) 
The December 8, 1980 stipulation indicated that 
there had been a previous "inJ unction" to the one which was 
3 Blacks Law Dictionary 96 (5th Ed. 1979) 
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-entered into by the stipulation. That injunction was a 
preliminary injunction ordered on September 12, 1978, sup-
ported by Plaintiffs' nominal bond of $500 "for the payment 
of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by 
any party who is found to be wrongfully enjoined or re-
strained." (R68, emphasis added.) 
At the time of the December 8, 1980 stipulation, 
Appellants stipulated to extend this injunction indefinitely, 
no mention of any bond being made. And, as is the general 
rule, when an injunction is made permanent, the requirement 
of a bond is not applicable, the parties having stipulated 
that the relief is appropriate and not wrongful. School 
Board of Consol. Dist. No. 36 v. Edwards, 87 P. 2d 962, 968 
(Okla. 1939). Moreover, it is a requirement that can be 
"waived or dispensed with by stipulation of the party en-
joined, or his counsel". Laundry Dry Cleaning, Dye House 
Workers Union v. Laundry International Union, 4 Wis.2d 542, 
91 N.W.2d 320, 328 (1958). 
Thus, Finding of Fact No. 9 entered by the Court 
on March 6, 1981, which makes the September 28, 1978 preli-
minary injunction "permanent" grants no greater relief than 
that to which the Appellants had earlier stipulated. (R305; 
cf. Rl62) 
The court's explanation that he found no indication 
in the file that the Appellants had stipulated to a "permanent" 
injunction is lexically correct, but legally meaningless. 
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( R34, ll 1 io ) The s tipul a tlon executed in December that the 
injunction "remain in full force and effect and ... not tc 
dismissed with the dismissal of the Complaint" cleari1 
reflects the intent and understanding that the injunction te 
permanent. Thus, while the Judge may see the judgment 
awarded as technically different from the stipulation, in 
result they are the same. Those attorneys' fees expended b7 
Respondent Girard in obtaining by trial a remedy no greater 
than that to which the Appellants had already stipulated 
should be denied. Rather, the Respondent's efforts to 
forfeit the lease resulted in a lengthy trial which the 
Appellants successfully defended, only to be assessed at-
torney's fees after the trial. 
POINT V 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF 
BASED UPON AFFIDAVITS TO WHICH THERE WERE 
CONTRARY AFFIDAVITS IN THE FILE AS TO BOTH 
THE ISSUES OF AMOUNT AND REASONABLENESS IS 
IMPROPER UNDER BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JURIS-
P RUDEN CE APPLICABLE TO ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS 
AND AMOUNTS TO TRYING ISSUES BY AFFIDAVIT. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in discussing the foun-
dation upon which attorney's fees could be awarded concluded 
in Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P. 2d 1039 
(Utah 1975) that attorney's fees cannot be awarded without 
either a "stipulation as to the amount, an unrebutted aff:-
davi t or evidence given as to the value thereof." 537 F.2d 
at 1040 (emphasis added). This case substantially delineate5 
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the line which must be drawn in considering an affidavit as 
sufficient evidence of attorney's fees. 
Even when not contradicted by opposing affidavits, 
affidavits are "commonly regarded as weak evidence, to be 
received with caution" 32A C.J.S., Evidence, § 1052 at 706 
(1964) See also Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Cal. 2d 144, 173 P.2d 657, 
660, (1946); Audit Services, Inc. v. Kraus Construction, Inc. 
615 P.2d 183 (Mont. 1980). Thus, where an objection has 
been made "to an affidavit as evidence and where there is a 
contest involved and where the effect of an adverse order 
was tantamount to a judgment for money, proof of facts may 
not be made by ex parte affidavits without the right of 
cross-examination." Stenfonick v. Stenfonick, 167 P.2d 867, 
869 (Mont. 1946). In actuality such treatment of affidavits 
is only a mechanism to see such documents in their true 
light as self-serving statements drawn up by representative 
counsel. Thus, an affidavit should be used only when testi-
mony is cumulative or of minor importance, not as in this 
instance where the outcome of the issue is directly dependent 
on the document. Lee Wayne Co. v. Pruitt, 550 P.2d 1374, 
1375 (Okla. 1976). See also Smith v. Miller, 213 Kan. l, 
514 P.2d 377 (1973). 
Such a situation presented here is analogous to a 
Rule 5 6 Motion for Summary Judgment. There, where contra-
dicting affidavits are pesented to the court, the selecting 
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of one affidavit over another affidavit filed by an opponent 
is, in short, grossly inappropriate. 
The award of attorney's fees to the Plaintiff on 
the basis of rebutted affidavits is a violation of the level 
of proof required to sustain such an award. The fact that 
the affidavits themselves are inappos1 te precludes judicial 
selection of one over another as the sole foundation to a 
finding of fact. ! See R322, 332, and 337) Simply stated, 
the affidavits of Mr. Miles and Mr. Boutwell were not unre-
butted. A third affidavit contested not only the viabili~ 
of the award, but the appropirate amount thereof, raising a 
factual issue which precludes a choice of one affidavit over 
another on the basis of the cold record. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS' 
ATTORNEY'S FEE IN TRYING IN LARGE PART ISSUES 
NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT AND IN SUCCESS-
FULLY RESISTING FORFEITURE OF THE LEASE WAS 
IMPROPER, SUCH FEES HAVING BEEN TESTIFIED TO 
AND BEING ALLOWABLE PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW. 
The court indicates that the rationale behind the 
sua sponte motion to reopen and accept affidavits on attor-
ney's fees as being the confusion which resulted from the 
uncertainty which existed as to the triable issues caused by 
Respondent's own counsel. During the trial, Respondent 
Girard made several attempts to aimend the complaint and add 
additional causes of action, most of which had occured long 
after the suit was initiated. Although the court noted 
Appellants' continuing objections to all testimony pertaining 
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to matter outside of the relevant insurance questions, it 
allowed such testimony to enter into the record and reserved 
its ruling on those issues until judgment. As a result, the 
Appellants spent a large part of the trial defending the 
lease and forfeiture thereof by resisting issues not properly 
before the court. 
Under paragraph 12 of the lease, the Defendants/ 
Appellants are entitled to attorneys fees as a result of 
trying a case for several days defending their position that 
the lease should be upheld and not forfeited. To deny Appel-
lants their attorney's fees by finding them in default 
ignores the testimony of Doug Labrum, called by the Respon-
dents, which testimony clearly establishes, as preserved in 
the partial transcript, that Appellants had cured the default 
within the 30 day grace period allowed by the lease, and 
prior to the filing of suit. (P-3, ~13; PT Labrum's testimony, 
seriatum, R-1 showing suit filed May 8, 1978) 
Yet another reason for denying Appellants' attorney's 
fees is equally fallacious, that is, that they were not 
expended in establishing a breach of one of their leasehold 
rights by Respondent. One such right is stated in 49 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Landlord & Tenant, §330, p.344 as follows: 
[T)he rule now established by nearly all 
courts is that the ordinary lease of realty, 
if valid, and executed by a .Person capab+e of 
making such a covenant, raises an implied 
covenant that the lessee shall have the quite 
and peaceable possession and enjoyment of the 
leased premises . . . unless there is some 
express covenant of a more limited character 
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inconsistent w1 th a judicial covenant of 
quiet enjoyment, an express stipulation 111 
the lease that nothrng therein contained 
should be construed to imply a covenant for 
quiet en]oyment, or a statutory provision, 
which is applicable to leases, abohshino 
implied covenants. , 
None of these exceptions to the established rule 
of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment apply in the 
instant case. No evidence was presented at trial to shew 
that that lease was invalid or that it was not executed bi 3 
person capable of making a covenant of quiet enjoyment, nor 
is there any provision in the lease itself restricting 
lessees' right to quiet enjoyment, and no Utah statute 
applicable to leases abolishes implied covenants in leases 
for real property. 
There is, therefore, in the lease before the court 
an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment of the leasehold 
premises, and in defending against Respondent Girard' s 
attempt to forfeit their leasehold interest, Appellants were 
clearly enforcing their rights pursuant to the terms of the 
lease as implied by law. As stated by the Utah Supreme 
Court rn Heywoodv. Odgen Motor Car Co., 266 P. 1040 (Utah 
1928): 
The written lease does not contain an express 
covenant of quiet enjoyment. It is, however, 
quite generally held that a covenant of quiet 
enjoyment by the lessors is implied in every 
lease for a term of years. Id. at 1042. 
The Hevwood case was cited for this same proposition in 
Sandall v. Hoskins, 137 P.2d 819 (Utah 19·±3), and this 
holding has never been reversed. 
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As Appellants successfully defended their rights 
of quiet enjoyment during trial, they are entitled to a 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in upholding their 
rights under the lease, and the sum of $2,000 as a reasonable 
sum for such attorney's fees was testified to at the trial 
and was not objected to by counsel for Plaintiffs. Clearly, 
this amount should be awarded to Appellants, and assessed 
against the Respondent Girard. 
CONCLUSION 
Four Plaintiffs initially filed suit in the instant 
case claiming a breach of a lease by the alleged failure of 
lessees to maintain insurance on the premises as called for 
therein. Lessees received notice of this problem in mid-March 
of 1978 though all the parties to the lease were previously 
aware of it. The testimony of an insurance agent called on 
the Lessors' behalf at trial established, however, that the 
Lessees had obtained insurance by reason of a binder being 
issued on March 20, 1978 and thus had timely cured this 
default within the parameters of the lease. 
Despite this, on May 8, 1978, when there was com-
plete insurance coverage on the premises, the Lessors filed a 
verified complaint seeking a forfeiture of the lease as well 
as a temporary injunction mandating that no operation of the 
leased premises occur without the existence of valid insurance 
coverage. 
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In September of 1978, the court issued a prelimi-
nary injunction on the nominal bond of $500 ordering the 
Lessees to maintain insurance throughout their operation of 
the leased premises. A final policy of insurance was issued 
approximately at that time. By November of 1980, three of 
the four named plaintiffs in the suit were desirous of 
dismissing the action and instructed their attorney, Mr. 
Ronald Boutwell, to do so. Mr. Boutwell, together with 
Appellants' attorney, Mr. Hughes, executed a stipulation 
reflecting this intent on December 8, 1980. 
The remaining plaintiff, Salli Smith Girard, 
proceeded to trial seeking therein to amend her cause of 
action and proceed on theories not properly before the 
court. The Appellants below successfully defended their 
right to quiet enjoyment of the leasehold and the court in 
its discretion sustained Appellants' objections to evidence 
and exhibits pertaining to issues not formally framed in the 
pleadings. 
At the end of the Appellants' defense, their 
attorney, under oath, testified to a reasonable attorney's 
fee of $2, 000. The Respondent Girard' s attorneys cross-
examined in an attempt to belatedly establish a reasonable 
attorney's fee on their client's behalf. In its initial 
findings and order, the lower court reflected that the 
Respondent Girard' s attorneys had presented no evidence 
whatsoever on the issue of attorney's fees. Nonetheless, 
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the court sua sponte reopened the matter to allow the Respon-
dent Girard yet one more day in court to present this evi-
dence. 
This appeal sets forth those reasons in law and in 
equity upon which the Appellants feel Mrs. Girard's rights, 
if any, should be deemed waived or denied. In the instant 
case, the true nature of the adversary system was thwarted by 
the independent arbiter's assuming the position of Respon-
dent's advocate and then subsequently awarding her attorney's 
fees. 
The Respondent Girard chose to bear her burden of 
proof once the court had unjustifiably reopened the case on 
her behalf by the filing of controverted affidavits. These 
affidavits are at best weak evidence of an appropriate attor-
ney's fee. Furthermore, one of the affidavits is filed by 
Mr. Boutwell, who at the time of trial, neither represented 
Mrs. Girard nor appeared as an attorney in the matter. In 
short, his affidavit states what a reasonable attorney's fee 
for his services would be, but does not allude to whether 
Mrs. Girard is obligated to him for that amount or whether 
that amount has in fact ever been paid. 
Beyond seeking reversal of the court's award of 
attorney's fees to the Respondent Girard, Appellants strenu-
ously urge that the attorney's fees expended by them in 
sustaining the lease and in upholding their rights of quiet 
enjoyment, which are implied under the laws of the State of 
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Utah, should be granted. These fees, contrary to those of 
the Respondent Girard, are based upon sworn testimony which 
was properly subject to cross-examination. It is the posit1o~ 
of the lessees that as a result of a lengthy trial in which 
they were successful at defending their rights to the lease-
hold, the lessees are equitably entitled to an award for 
attorney's fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of August, 
1981. 
ALLEN, THOMPSON & HUGHES 
--,1',I '// // i -/1 / / ~.;' I. ., , ,-· / , / ( ' / ~ 
!, / !,, 'a:~ 0:..-:..t. ":Ho /)-('?:.; '(_,~.-:J-
MICHAEL D. HUGHES /, 
Attorney for Defendants/Appe lants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 2.~ay of August, 
1981, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF 
OF APPELLANTS to Mr. John L. Miles and Mr. J. MacArthur 
Wright at 60 North 300 East, St. George, UT 84770, postage 
prepaid. 
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